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The idea that theology might have something to say to science, especially if we see this as 
one of its responsibilities, might seem to us to be an odd question to ask. Ever since C.P. 
Snow proposed the idea of the ‘two cultures’, the impression of many, apart from those 
with a keen interest in interactions between science and religion, is that sciences are best 
left to their own devices. It seems obvious, at first sight, that it is primarily in the realms of 
history, language, literature, art and music that theology can find welcome dialogue 
partners. In popular culture, too, there is a residual memory that over-zealous religious 
fanatics in some way constricted science. The stories of conflict between Thomas Huxley 
and Bishop Wilberforce, Galileo and the Holy See, have become inflated into mythologies 
of distrust and suspicion. The fact that the real historical accounts show many more 
nuances than this is important to establish, but is not really the point I am making here. 
Rather, I am suggesting that we have become so used to seeing the two areas of theology 
and science as separate, that we fail to notice in what ways the culture we live in is also 
one shaped by science, and that science itself is a profoundly cultural activity. 
 
The temptation for those engaged in the dialogue between science and religion is simply 
to examine the particular discoveries in science and then discuss their implications for 
theology. While this can take us some way in the process of mutual understanding, what 
tends to happen is that science becomes the active partner, while theology is merely the 
passive recipient of what science is discovering. John Polkinghorne, who has done more 
than anyone to foster links between the two disciplines in a publicly responsible way, 
insists that theology needs to be consistent with the discoveries of science.(1) Such 
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interactions are clearly valuable for those who find it hard to believe in the doctrines of the 
church, while admitting the truths of science. Writing of this type can be an apologetic both 
for science and the church. Yet while it is true that theologians need to have some 
awareness of the discoveries of science, it seems to me that theology can play a much 
more active role in the debate as well. 
 
Nicholas Lash suggests that in science and technology, our ‘ingenuity has outstripped our 
wisdom'.(2) This implies that science alone has failed to take adequate responsibility for its 
own applications. However, even a veiled criticism of this type is likely to be met with 
hostility by the scientists themselves. I will argue in this paper that fruitful questions to ask 
are: In what way is science contributing to a particular culture? and How might theology 
contribute to a reshaping of this ethos? Further, I suggest that once we understand 
science as a profoundly human activity, then dialogue with other areas of knowledge, 
including theology, becomes possible. Moreover, it seems to me that the responsibility of 
all theologians is to have some awareness of the activities of science at the cultural level. 
 
Facts and values 
We seem to have come a long way from seeing theology as the 'queen of the sciences', 
where all knowledge was in some sense united under an overarching cosmology of God, 
humanity and nature in an ordered universe. Even post-modernism, which relies on a 
hermeneutics of suspicion, is still in some sense a child of modernity. The theoretical 
physicists Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont roundly rejected the attempt by French post-
modem philosophers, including among others, Irigaray, Lacan and Lyotard to support their 
views by drawing on their mathematical formulations.(3) They insisted that their work was 
'abused' and distorted, enlarged to support speculations that were completely unrelated to 
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the original ideas. They even went as far as publishing a hoax article in an American 
journal called Social Text, deliberately offering a parody of the new physics as simply a 
linguistic construct. It seems likely that the French theorists were unjustified in their use of 
science. However, I will show later that some scientists are quite adept at enlarging their 
science into myths. One possible explanation for the hostility of Sokal and Bricmont is that 
it seemed to them to break what has become a sacred code, that science is objective. 
Ironically, perhaps, the fact/value distinction is itself beginning to break down with the 
advent of quantum physics. Those attuned to this new physics recognize that all our 
observations affect, in some way, what is observed, the world is one of probabilities. This 
does not mean that facts in the new physics suffer from the same foibles as values, as 
many social scientists would have us believe. For practical purposes we still operate 
according to a Newtonian system, the laws of gravity and motion still have relevance to our 
everyday existence. An argument can be made for an expansion of Newtonian physics to 
include more recent research, rather than a simplistic replacement of one by another. In 
this sense the mythology of the split between facts and values survives, albeit in a more 
muted form. 
 
Rather than simply showing that there are values in science, a more interesting question is 
to ask, why is it necessary for many working scientists to hold this view of value-neutrality? 
I suggest that it is in discovering some of the reasons for this belief that core aspects of the 
culture of the sciences come into view. The origin of the idea that science is value-free can 
be traced to four key factors:(4) 
1.    Ideal of theoria. This is based on Aristotelian principles that science must be 
detached from practical affairs. In this sense science becomes value-free, as it is 
more about principles and theory than practice. Francis Bacon was a champion of 
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the idea of the utility of science and the usefulness for human benefit This tended to 
weaken the distinction between theory and practice in a way that continues even 
today. 
2.     Scientific method. A core goal of scientific method was to achieve objectivity, with 
no traces of influence from 'bias' that might be caused by moral or other qualities, 
such as religious beliefs. Such beliefs would, it is argued, distort any knowledge 
gained. As I hinted earlier, the recognition that pure objectivity is ultimately 
impossible in science as well, as shown by modern physics and some areas of 
biology, such as ecology, has failed to dent the quest, at least, for objective 
knowledge. 
3.    The nature of value. Prior to the Copernicus' revolution, the ancients believed that 
value is God-given, built into the structure of the cosmos. In science the idea that 
value is created by human agency, rather than in raw nature, is presupposed. 
Scientists assume an instrumental approach to value, in other words that value is 
measured by its usefulness to humanity. Accordingly, the world of nature becomes 
value-free, or 'disenchanted', and no longer organized according to natural 
harmonies. Science is neutral because nature is neutral, it is just an exploration of 
the efficient causes of laws in nature, without any reference to the idea of purpose. 
4.    The security of knowledge. The philosopher, Euripides believed that knowledge of 
nature was 'safe', that is it was free from politics and ethics. Francis Bacon 
conferred that knowledge of nature was neutral and a Christian understanding of 
the Fall is related to the knowledge of good and evil. He identified moral knowledge 
as 'dangerous'. In spite of his protestations for neutrality, he envisaged science as 
the herald to a new Utopia on earth. By the nineteenth century a much narrower 
conception of science had emerged, where science was specialized and 
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fragmented into numerous sub-disciplines. However, even as the bulk of science 
became the servant of industry, the longing of many scientists for purity of 
knowledge continued, especially in the universities. 
 
Given these possible reasons for scientists wishing to hold on to the ideal of value-
neutrality, it is worth considering how such a proposal could serve to promote the interests 
of science. It is too simplistic to consider that scientists do not recognize the importance of 
values themselves, rather they believe that in providing a detached approach to the 




The rise of modern experimental science is a curiously Western phenomenon. 
Nonetheless, few would doubt that in pre-modern times the Oriental nations were 
responsible for considerable advances in science. Needham's extensive historical 
research on the relationship between science and society in the East and West suggests 
that it was the prevailing social, intellectual and economic conditions of Renaissance 
Europe that were primarily responsible for the breakthroughs in science occurring in the 
West.(5) The experimental science that flowered in Europe seemed too interventionist to 
be philosophically respectable. For the purposes of this article I will be focusing on the 
dialogue between theology and Western science, rather than other versions that have 
been proposed, such as Islamic science. 
 
While it is too simplistic to suggest that Christianity was responsible for the emergence of 
science in the West, it certainly did not inhibit its growth. It is well known that many of the 
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early scientists were also Christians, such as the physicist Isaac Newton and the botanist 
John Ray. Amos Funkenstein looks back to a time when science and religion still 
coexisted in the seventeenth century synthesis. He highlights the way these writers tried to 
fuse the Scholastic desire for purification of language about forms, with the Renaissance 
ideal of homogeneity in nature. The result was a univocal language of science and an 
objectification of knowledge.(6) Lash believes that this ideal led to an effective dismissal of 
other ways of reading texts, a rejection of narrative, poetry and paradox. He identifies the 
'spectatorial' model of humanity's relationship with nature as the most significant factor that 
reduces other ways of interpreting the world.(7) 
 
While Lash's analysis is worth taking seriously, I believe that there were other social 
factors that contributed to the elevation of science as a way of knowing. Funkenstein 
suggests that the most significant change in the seventeenth century was the belief that 
knowledge could be acquired through construction, through doing, a factor that Lash 
seems to ignore.(8) This idea of construction is significant as it opens the way for 
experimental science in a way that pure observation did not. Although many of these 
writers confined the concept of construction of nature to God and only allowed humans to 
construct their social reality, it was only a short step before the idea took hold that all 
knowing is related to experimental pragmatism. While observation is passive and more 
akin to contemplation, popular in the medieval world, doing is active and allows for 
experimental human intervention that is necessarily characteristic of modern science. I 
suggest that in addition to these philosophical factors, the practical success of science 
tended to support and reinforce its ideals. The implication of this analysis is that science 
became not just enculturated in the Western world, but a shaper of that culture as well. Yet 
we might ask ourselves if this model still needs some refinement. The practice of science 
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is not as detached as it seems, scientists work in communities and develop their own 
narratives, some might even suggest their own wisdom. Before the modern shift to a 
scientific cultural ethos is cast too quickly in a negative light, it is worth teasing out 
elements of what the culture of the sciences might be like. 
 
Exploring elements of scientific culture 
I have already examined in some detail one aspect of scientific culture that has begun to 
break down, namely the claim to be value-free. Other, related, claims are that science is 
transcultural and apolitical. It would be foolish to suggest that certain experiments in 
science cannot be repeated in different cultural and political settings, though it is equally 
fallacious to suggest that science policy is an entirely neutral affair. Scientists themselves 
are now beginning to acknowledge this as well. While in Britain the 1960s and 1970s 
political debates were primarily about the regulatory bodies that controlled access to funds, 
by the 1980s, under the Thatcher government, the key criterion was commercial utility, an 
attitude that is still pervasive today. Finally, the 1990s debates are primarily over survival, 
with the creation of a 'superleague' of 'research' universities.(9) Given this squeeze on 
funding, it is hardly surprising that scientists in universities have turned more and more to 
funding from the military or commercial sectors, with their own particular vested interests. 
Scientists in the 1990s are now much more on the defensive, lacking their earlier 
confidence. Yet there are elements of traditional ideals of science that still persist, in spite 
of the increased fragmentation and specialisation. 
 
While political and other pressures on scientists will diminish their interest in seeking truth 
as they perceive it in the natural world, it is important to acknowledge the strength of this 
claim. Hanbury Brown describes science in the following way: 
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it acts as our essential link with reality and if we fail to maintain this link, then there 
is no longer any 'nature's truth', nor is there 'public truth', there is only 'your truth' 
and 'my truth' and we are in danger of losing the distinction between fact and fiction 




Brown's claim that science is an arbiter of truth can easily slide into scientism. A check on 
such a development emerges in the New Physics. However, the recognition in quantum 
theory that the observer conditions all observations, does not lead to the opposite extreme 
of subjective truth. Rather, any objectivity needs to be qualified and not claimed to be final 
in any sense. This leads to more searching for what David Deutsch has described as the 
Fabric of Reality.(11) Richard Dawkins points out that for scientists fiddling data or lying 
about the results is, in scientific practice, the one unforgivable sin. For him there is 
'something almost sacred about nature's truth'.(12) However, before the search itself is 
dismissed, it seems to me that such ideals, however misplaced, were necessary in order 
to foster its achievements. As Polanyi has reminded us, science involves a personal, 
committed way of approaching the world that bears some resemblance to a faith 
commitment. Also as Pope John Paul suggests, every truth presents itself as a universal 
claim, even if it is not the whole truth. He even defines the human being as 'the one who 
seeks the truth'. Furthermore, for scientists it is the personal confidence that an answer 
can be found that spurs on the search.(13) The euphoria of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries about the unlimited possible benefits of science has now faded, but few 
would wish to live in a world without clean water, electricity, antibiotics and medicines that 
make human life possible. The search for truth in the theological sense is related to 
answers to ultimate questions, but also in the context of a human community of faith. 
While the ultimate Truth for a Christian is revealed in Jesus Christ, this is not opposed to 
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the truths found in the natural order of things discovered by scientists. However, not all 
claims to truth in science are compatible with the Christian vision of Truth. 
 
Another aspect of the culture of science that is easy to omit is that of wonder. It is curiosity 
about life, as well as the search for truth, that often drives scientists in their search. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the real interest in science came from sheer 
enjoyment of its practice. This was a technologically innocent world, having an exuberance 
that is hard, perhaps, for us to imagine with our popular image of scientists today as 
terribly serious. It becomes much harder, though I would argue not impossible, to sustain 
this vision once experimental techniques are adopted. In other words it is the particular 
way of looking that is significant. Is it a looking with a view to control, or is it a tuning in to 
the natural world through careful listening? 
 
It is, perhaps, surprising that Richard Dawkins, who is one of the champions of the 
mechanistic ways of looking at the world, has also declared recently that science is the 
ultimate source of wonder. He admits that this is deliberate attempt on his part to shake off 
the image of someone who has piped too long to the tune of the Selfish Gene. For him: 
"The feeling of awed wonder that science can give us is one of the highest experiences of 
which the human psyche is capable. It is a deep esthetic passion to rank with the finest 
that music and poetry can deliver'.(14) He suggests that science helps us break out of the 
numbness of the familiar by opening up new worlds in a way that leads to wonder. Related 
to the idea of wonder is the search for beauty, which is connected with an understanding 
of the truths of science. In as far as he points to the wonders of creation his book is a kind 
of proto-theology. However, it is a deliberate attempt to redirect those who search for 
poetry and mysticism in religion to science and science alone. His affirmation of the role of 
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imagination in science is not new. What does seem strange is the way he aims to redirect 
all imagination to science itself. It is here that his sense of wonder is ultimately 
problematic, as it seems to point to the self-glorification of human activities in science 
alone. 
 
Modern experimental science is often stereotyped as viewing nature as a machine, rather 
than an organism. Feminist critics of science, such as Carolyn Merchant, have been 
particularly critical of the machine metaphor, believing that this led to both the 
desacralisation and 'death' of nature.(15) She identifies science, epitomized in the figure of 
Francis Bacon, as responsible for the domination of both nature and women. However, 
before concluding too rapidly that a return to an organic approach is all that is required 
three issues need to be born in mind. The first is that without some sense of nature as 
'other', which is characteristic of the Judeo-Christian faith, I have my doubts if any of the 
benefits of science would have been realized. The second is that one of the key 
characteristics of experimental scientific method is its claim to search for causes in nature, 
rather than through reference to a Scholastic 'final cause'.(16) The third issue is that it is 
too simplistic to think of science as just treating nature as a machine. In practice both the 
romantic and more mechanistic approaches to science have existed side by side, though it 
was the mechanistic view that attracted the most institutional support.(17) The organic 
approach has its dangers, too, in particular that associated with fascism. The holistic 
approach to science was very popular in Germany at around the time of the Third Reich. 
Its positive contribution was a fostering of multilevel discourses. However, the fear of the 
fascism that this seemed to support effectively dampened this movement in scientific 
circles. I am not arguing that organic approaches to nature are necessarily fascist, rather 
that there are dangers in both extreme versions of mechanism or organicism. Replacing 
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mechanistic philosophy with an equally problematic holism does not take us very far. 
 
Theology and scientism 
Scientism may take different shapes. A common one is that science is the ultimate source 
of knowledge. The positivist claim that everything is within the power of science still lingers 
on today, in writing such as that of Peter Atkins, so that he claims that 'there is no question 
whose answer is not attainable by science.(18) Deutsch, like Dawkins, argues that the 
basis of life is molecular, so that the organism is the environment of the replicators known 
as genes.(19) For Deutsch life is a 'side effect' of the macroscopic physical processes 
operating at the molecular level. However, he cannot bring himself to believe that life will 
ultimately be meaningless, as the logic of such a view might suggest. Rather, if we 
assume a closed universe, that is a universe ending in a 'Big Crunch', we are only a tenth 
of the way through history from the early 'Big Bang'. He concurs with Frank Tipler, who 
suggests a infinite future for intelligent life. 
 
Frank Tipler's portrait is interesting as he uses theological language to support his 
views.(20) His position is a curious one, in that while claiming to be an atheist, he wraps 
his physical models in the language of God. He suggests that the future does make an 
imprint on the present, since the physical laws do not change with time. However, it is by 
no means clear how this might be an imprint from ahead, in the way a Christian 
understanding of the parousia would suggest. Furthermore, immortality for Tipler seems to 
mean simply information processing. Such processing is dependent on increasing 
availability of energy as the 'final singularity' approaches. While the proper time will 
inevitably come to an end in a closed universe, he suggests that it could exist for infinite 
subjective time. For him distinctions between living and non-living no longer exist, until life 
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so pervades and controls the system that it reaches what he terms the 'Omega Point'. 
While he borrows the language from Teilhard de Chardin, he modifies his theology in 
important ways. Teilhard understood God as immanent in an evolving universe and yet 
transcendent through a form of pan-en-theism, but Tipler cannot ultimately avoid 
pantheism. For Tipler such an 'Omega Point' means total omnipresence and omnipotence 
and omniscience, the final convergence of space and time through which a new 
resurrection is made possible, one that is envisaged as the Person, who is God. Such a 
resurrection of past humanity seems to be in the forms of light rays, extracted as 
information to be used at the very instant of the Omega Point.(21) 
 
What is left of the reality of human life in such speculations? If this is a scientific 
eschatology, it is an apocalypse indeed. Yet it is one with no real hope of transformation 
and new life. It is in stark contrast to the biblical view of the end where ultimately, following 
immense struggles, all creation is caught up in praise and worship of God. In the models of 
both Deutsch and Tipler, science has refused to let go of intelligence and turned this into a 
god to be perpetuated ad infinitum. Such pride is more likely to accelerate the fate of the 
destruction of the earth, rather than allow its perpetuation in the form of information. Far 
from being a cosmological vision of the future, it is one that rests ultimately with human 
abilities alone, even though such abilities are recast in theological language. In this it 
fosters the idea of control and domination of humanity over not just this earth, but far into 
the outer reaches of the galaxy as well. 
 
Another shape that scientism may take is that it is the ultimate source of values. Richard 
Dawkins' thesis expressed in The Selfish Gene might, at first sight, give the impression 
that he locates our ultimate source of value in our genes alone.(22) However, to be more 
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precise he argues that altruism is 'selfish' as far as genes that code for such behaviour is 
concerned, since evolution is dependent on conservation of particular genes. Mary 
Midgley's initial misunderstanding of this led to some bitter debate, though I think she is 
right to suggest that the language he uses is too suggestive of moral action to be 
contained in the way that he suggests. In the other words statements such as 'we are 
survival machines' are inevitably value-laden. Dawkins himself betrays certain weariness 
when he says recently: 'I am tired of being identified with a vicious politics of ruthless 
competitiveness, accused of advancing selfishness as a way of life'.(23) Rather, the 
Darwinian notion of nature 'red in tooth and claw' is a lifestyle that he believes we need to 
vehemently reject. He also rejects the idea of eugenics, though admits that science does 
not rule it out as a possibility. For him, nothing, not even human values, should deny 
science its possibilities. 
 
Hence, while he denies that science is an ultimate source of values, he seems to 
contradict this by elevating the value of scientific knowledge. A second important thread to 
his work is his belief that science can discover the way values emerge and are transmitted 
in human communities. Such values evolve through a process of Darwinian natural 
selection. However, while natural selection led to the emergence of humans with large 
brains, our ability to think and have foresight means that we can act against what might 
seem to be the dictates of our genes. He introduces another concept, namely that of 
'memes', which are cultural constructs passed between members of the human 
community. Such memes compete for survival and, like genes, only some survive. He calls 
this the 'science of values', that is a particular biological way of interpreting how values are 
passed from one generation to the next. With some irony he suggests that just as those 
who dismiss the claims of the Old Testament as a source of values, so too he is entitled to 
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chose not to behave as one governed entirely by his genetic make up.(24) He admits that 
this leaves us in an 'ethical vacuum' and this is what we should admit to instead of 
claiming to gain our sense of value from a religious source. 
 
It seems to me that even if biological research suggests that there is a biological 
component to altruism or even values, then this is not necessarily incompatible with 
Christian belief. We might chose to challenge its scientific basis by pointing to the fact that 
values emerge in a complex and intricate way in human culture in a way that only has a 
very tenuous link with genetics. Memes, in particular, sound like an over-extrapolation of 
what is known in evolutionary theory. It is when sociobiology is claimed to be the only 
explanation that it becomes particularly dangerous. While Richard Dawkins refuses to 
accept that he gains his values from science, he denies the possibility of any religious 
experience as having any value at all. It seems to me that to be logically consistent he 
would have to admit this as being a possibility, especially as the science on its own has left 
us in an 'ethical vacuum'. In addition, his system of priorities still come from scientific 
analysis, so it is more likely that his values are rooted in science as knowledge in general 
sense, even if they are not crudely identified with his particular hypothesis of the selfish 
gene. 
 
It is ironical, perhaps, that a form of scientism as the ultimate basis for value also comes 
from those at the organic end of the scientific spectrum. I refer to the Gaia hypothesis of 
James Lovelock. I do not intend to discuss this hypothesis in detail, except to say that it 
has become a source of values for those wishing to re-construct a worldview on more 
ecological lines. The fact that the hypothesis itself is highly ambiguous ethically is a point 
ignored by many of its advocates. It is also surprising that Mary Midgley, who has actively 
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campaigned against scientism in all its forms, seems to be quite ready to affirm Lovelock's 
approach as highly suggestive for philosophy and ethics.(25) 
 
Theology and the future of science 
So far I have argued that the relation between the sciences and culture is a highly dynamic 
one. Just as science is in some sense encultured in human experience, so too science 
fosters a particular ethos and way of looking at the world. A theological approach to this 
aspect of science suggests that while we may welcome some elements of a scientific 
ethos, others need to be treated with much more caution. In particular, we need to resist 
all attempts to make science the ultimate source of knowledge and values. It is no use just 
making the simple claim that science discovers the facts and others apply these in good or 
evil ways. Rather, the very questions that science sets itself to ask need to be considered 
in the light of the needs of the human community. 
 
I am not suggesting that all science needs to be controlled by pragmatic aims, rather that 
the motivation for particular directions in science needs to be evaluated in defining science 
policy. Perhaps we need to recover something of the ancient idea of wisdom, where 
science was no longer disjointed from other human pursuits, but was part of a 
philosophical and theological framework. The methodology of science makes it hard for 
scientists themselves to undertake such a broadening of their vision. Yet if theology is to 
offer something to science it is surely this; an affirmation of its values of wonder, beauty, 
reason, truth and imagination, but at the same time a rejection of arrogance, closed 
mindedness and irresponsibility, especially in certain applications in technology. In the 
place of the 'ethical vacuum' left by biological science, theology can bring a framework for 
ethics. However, if nature alone is looked to as a source of ultimate value, it is bound to 
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disappoint. In the words of Pope John Paul II, scientists need to: 
 
continue their efforts without abandoning the sapiential horizon within which 
scientific and technological achievements are wedded to the philosophical and 
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